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COMMONS FOR SALE. 








This study examines a facet of institutional change in 19
th Century 
Spain. Empirical analysis of a zone in the Ebro valley confirms that 
the process of selling commons prior to the 1855 Ley de 
Desamortización (Disentailment Law) was of great significance. It 
evaluates the nature of the changes in property rights and identifies 
the main social protagonists of the era, with the aim of analysing the 
repercussions these had on production and on the distribution of 
agrarian income.  
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Institutional changes associated with the development of capitalism 
in agriculture have been deemed worthy of considerable attention in the 
past. Based on a perspective that draws from the rich liberal or Marxist 
traditions and using either serial history methods or those of retrospective 
econometrics, the analysis of changes to property rights constitutes a 
crossroads of focuses and historiographical interests. You need look no 
further than at the copious literature that has accumulated on the British 
Enclosures, on the French Biens Nationaux, or on the Spanish 
Desamortizaciones.
1 
During the decades of 1970 and 1980 many studies were conducted 
on the latter, all of which were based on one common and somewhat 
paradoxical denominator: the central administration of the State played the 
leading role in the process, but (like the witch’s apprentice) it was powerless 
when it came to controlling the consequences of its own actions.  It had the 
strength to undertake ambitious land reforms that were detrimental to 
powerful interests but was weak when it came to implementing them.  An 
explanation for this paradox was thought to have been rooted in the 
problems of the Exchequer and in the political weakness of the bourgeoisie, 
                                                 
1 The recent syntheses of Mingay, Parliamentary Enclosure, Bodinier & Teyssier, 
L’evénement le plus important, and Rueda, La Desamortización, are provided by way of 
illustration only. For a complete overview of the offensive against communal property in 
Europe and America see  Demélas & Vivier, Les proprietés collectives. An example of the 
diversity of focuses that may be taken on the theme can be seen in the recent articles of 
Clark, ‘Common sense’, and Birtles, ‘Common land, poor relief’, that deal with the English 
case from the perspectives of cliometry and social history respectively.   3
whereby initiatives that presumably had been embarked upon to liberalise 
and distribute property and create an extensive rural middle class dedicated 
to liberal revolution actually resulted in the consolidation of an agrarian 
oligarchy.  This is one of the main arguments put forward to explain the 
atraso (relative economic backwardness) of contemporary Spain.
 2 
This line of argument gives the so-called Madoz Law or Ley de 
Desamortización General, promulgated 1 May 1855, a leading role.  On the 
one hand it meant the culmination of ecclesiastic disentailment (after the 
1798, 1820, 1836 and 1841 laws, which primarily affected pious 
foundations and the regular clergy).  On the other hand it meant the seizure, 
and subsequent auction, of the assets of civil institutions namely town halls, 
schools and hospitals (which was given the name of civil disentailment).  So 
it involved a direct and general intervention of the State in land property 
structures, which also had repercussions on urban property and credit 
markets. Among the many and extensive consequences, Spanish 
historiography placed special emphasis on what it represented in terms of 
the break-up of the communal regime and the penetration of capitalism in 
agriculture. According to most of the studies done on the subject, the Law,  
declaring patrimonial assets (bienes de propios) and (with certain 
exceptions) the communal assets of the town councils as alienable would 
have suddenly altered the balance in country communities, encouraging the 
                                                 
2 An introduction (a little outdated) to Spanish economic historiography in Harrison, ‘The 
economic history’. For a more complete and updated view it is recommended that you read 
Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the Spanish Miracle, and Tortella, Development of modern 
Spain. Centred on political aspects: Burdiel, ‘Myths of failure’. Interpretations on the 
evolution of the agrarian sector fluctuate between the “pessimistic” vision of Simpson, 
Spanish agriculture, and the “optimistic” visions of Pujol et al, El pozo.   4
process of accumulation of wealth and the proletarisation of the peasantry, 
and would have encouraged extensive agricultural growth by facilitating the 
cultivation of disposed of lands.  In this way, the process of rural change can 
be interpreted from an exogenous variable, the State, and from a lineal 
perspective: the unstoppable advance of private, individual and total 
property.
 3  
In view of this interpretation of unidirectional historic change 
“from above” this paper poses a different reading; a reading in which the 
Madoz Law constitutes one more link in a more comprehensive process 
which has been managed “from below”;  an interpretation which attempts to 
avoid the simplification of considering the privatisation of property rights as 
an historically necessary, lineal and irreversible process.  With regard to the 
first point, there are already some works that point in the same direction, 
mainly through the study of the disposal of communal assets during the 
Peninsular War, although a global view of the process, albeit on a regional 
scale, is still lacking. 
4 
                                                 
3 The distinction between bienes de propios and comunales has its roots in the fact that the 
former generated regular income for the municipal treasuries, through the renting or 
administration of same. Neighbours could use the latter freely and without charge. Among 
the abundant bibliography on the Madoz disentailment, restricted to a provincial scope, we 
can cite the works of Artiaga Rego, A desamortización, González Marzo, La 
desamortización, Díez Espinosa, Desamortización, Gómez Oliver, La desamortización, o 
Iriarte Goñi, Bienes comunales. All of them offer a rigorous quantitative reconstruction of 
the phenomenon and an identification of its social protagonists. 
4 The first indications of this sale process prior to disentailment we owe to  Fernández de 
Pinedo, ‘La entrada de la tierra’ and to Fontana, ‘La financiación’. The first in-depth studies 
were those of De la Torre, Los campesinos, and Otaegui, Guerra y crisis. However, there 
are no equivalent works for the period between 1820 and 1855.. A recent aspect of the 
question, focussed on public woodlands, can be found in Jiménez Blanco’s, ‘El monte’. 
The crisis of the municipalities in Comín & García, ‘Haciendas locales’.   5
With regard to the second consideration, this work connects with a 
sensitivity that is presaged in more recent Spanish agrarian historiography in 
the sense of not avoiding the complexity of the historic processes of change 
and of not underestimating the adaptative capacity to different contexts that 
characterises capitalism.
 5 
This study sets out with a description and empirical analysis of the 
process involved in the conveyance of rights to cultivated land and large 
pasturelands, held in common ownership, in a specific geographical area – 
the Navarrese part of the Ebro valley – prior to the enforcement of the 
Madoz Law.  The primary objective pursued here is to provide greater 
insight into the process of institutional change associated with the Spanish 
bourgeois revolution; hence attention is paid to the rate at which commons 
were disposed of and the driving forces behind this process.  It also aims to 
identify the protagonists and beneficiaries of the process, and gauge the 




                                                 
5 The complex definition of property rights has been dealt with by Congost, ‘Property 
Rights’. Both GEHR, ‘Más allá de la propiedad perfecta’, and Iriarte Goñi, ‘Common 
Lands’, have examined the compatibility between common property and agrarian 
capitalism.  
6 The basic source used for this piece of work was the notary records of the localities in the 
southern half of Navarra that had been drawn up between 1826 and 1860 (Navarrese Notary 
Records Archive, henceforth AGN/P, Pamplona). Information was then completed with the 
inquiry prepared in 1862 by the Sales Committee of Navarra to exclude municipal estates 
from the process of disentailment (Administrative Archive of Navarra, henceforth AAN, 
Pamplona, boxes 12086-12089), and with the statistics drawn up by the Autonomous 
Committee on Agrarian Reform in 1937-38 (AAN, boxes 32669-32670). I have converted   6
 
As in all Europe, the area between the Ebro River and the western 
Pyrenees was shaken by the long cycle of revolution and war that broke out 
in 1789. The war against the French Convention between 1793 and 1796 
was followed by the Napoleonic military occupation in 1808 and the 
Peninsular War which lasted until 1813. The absolute monarchy was 
restored immediately through a coup d’etat (1814). Six years later,  the 
revolutionary movement of 1820 turned out to be the first attempt at liberal 
politics in Spain, finally putting into practice the work that had been carried 
out by the legislators at the Courts of Cadiz (1810-1814). 
Counterrevolutionary insurrection and international legitimism were to put 
an end to this brief interlude in 1823, but the new ideas saw their triumph 
one decade later, first in the form of a charte otorgée system (1834) that 
allowed integration of the more moderate sectors of liberalism and 
traditionalism; and soon after, in a more radical manner in the social unrest 
of 1835 and 1836 facilitated by the pressure of the 1833 Carlist 
counterrevolutionary uprising and the state of war that succeeded it lasting 
until 1839.  So, twenty of the fifty years that passed from the time of the 
outbreak of the revolution in Paris to the final establishment of a Liberal 
State in Spain were occupied by war. 
The financial cost of this agitated political movement reached 
proportions as yet unheard of in Navarra.  On the basis of various studies, 
the amount collected by the legal authorities, by the rebelling powers or 
directly by the regular troops and the guerrillas can be estimated, between 
                                                                                                                                               
the surface and monetary measurements to hectares and reales de vellón (henceforth rvn)   7
1808 and 1840, at a minimum threshold of 305.74 million reales de vellón 
(old Spanish coin worth a quarter of a peseta), but may have reached as 
much as 460 million.  The minimum average annual figure of 9.5 million 
reales collected during this period stands in stark contrast with the 
contributive quota of 1.8 million, which had been set for the province since 
August 1841.  In the absence of an efficient tax reform, the fiscal 
undertakings fell on the villages and individuals, in a notably arbitrary 
manner, through supplies and direct taxes, loans, fines, and looting.
7 
The public funds crisis and the growing fiscal pressures 
experienced in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, which were 
marked by military crises, are the primary factors in explaining the outflow 
of municipal patrimonies that preceded the Madoz Law, but were not the 
only ones. This process cannot be properly understood unless we include, 
amongst the driving forces behind it, the attitudes adopted by the social 
groups involved in face of the collapse of the absolutist institutions, the 
increasing integration of agrarian markets, and the triumph of a wealth 
criteria of social distinction.  Also of relevance was the pervasion into 
society of a paradigm of economic thinking, with liberal inspirations, that 
understood private property and free markets as the main regulators of 
                                                                                                                                               
made up of 34 maravedis. 
7 Of the sum checked, 169.5 million reales correspond to contributions and supplies to 
troops during the Napoleonic occupation (1808-13) and 105.67 million to that collected 
during the civil war (1833-39). The financial cost of this latter episode (particularly that 
collected by the defeated side) is what we know least about. It has been possible to partially 
reconstruct the figures based on De la Torre, Los campesinos, p.29, Del Río, Orígenes, 
p.135-146, Del Río, ‘Los antecedentes’, Del Río, Revolución liberal, p.382-388. Key 
analysis of the social history of the Napoleonic war in De la Torre, Lucha antifeudal, and in   8
productive and distributive activities. The outcome was the accumulation of 
legal provisions which since 1811 had been giving legal visibility and 
channels to these processes throughout a long legislative cycle, the pinnacle 
of which was the Ley de Desamortización General of 1 May 1855.
8 
The chronology of sales
9 and their characteristics are a good 
indication of the multiplicity of factors involved in the privatisation process. 
The collapse of the State in 1808 and the weight of military control over the 
population precipitated a massive wave of municipal land sales. Up to 1820, 
the process affected more than four thousand estates in Navarra, covering a 
surface area of 18,122 hectares. As would be the case again at a later stage, 
the types of properties sold were wide-ranging: suertes or small plots of 
land of equal size for crop growing; land already occupied under private 
possession but pending legalisation (roturos); pasture lands with or without 
woodland, close to rivers and where crops could be grown (sotos); or, 
finally, large pasturelands often with steppe vegetation used for  itinerant 
flocks of sheep (corralizas).  The high average price per hectare of the 
properties sold during these years reflects the fact that cultivable land was 
                                                                                                                                               
Tone, The fatal Knot. The financial relations between Navarra and the State, in De la Torre 
& García Zúñiga, ‘Hacienda foral’. 
8 Authors such as Cruz, Gentlemen, negate the existence of a social revolution in Spain 
from 1750-1843, limiting it to the political sphere. Others emphasize the social and cultural 
changes consolidated during this period; see Ruiz Torres, ‘La historiografía’. For a recent 
synthesis of the privatisation of commons see Perez Picazo, ‘Propriété collective’. 
9 In addition to the period 1808-20 studied by De la Torre, Los campesinos, I have 
compiled the series in five chronological periods that deal with the latter years of 
absolutism (1826-33), the civil war and the immediate post-war period (1834-40), the first 
years of the foral (autonomous) regime (1841-46), the years that separate the ephemeral 
moderated law on the sale of municipal property and the progressive law on general 
disentail (1847-55), and the years in which this last regulation was suspended (1855-60).   9
sold in abundance. The State, unable to regulate the process, as revealed in 
the various resolutions made from 1811 to 1814, saw its only solution in 
sanctioning sales and legalising them a posteriori.
10 
During the decade of 1820 the process of privatisation did not 
come to a halt, although the amount disposed of was much less, as villages 
were weighed down with the requirements of creditors and the Exchequer. 
The second great wave of privatisation struck in 1834.  Up to the end of the 
Carlist War 25,000 hectares were sold under conditions of absolute 
necessity. This explains why final sales prices were, on average, almost 
30% less than their assessed values, whereas during the previous war period 
these had been exceeded by almost 6 percent. In addition, prior to this 
occasion the State had established a legal framework that allowed villages to 
proceed with sales according to their requirements: in August 1834 and 
March 1835 the regulations laid out the administrative procedures and 
priorities for use of funds collected in this manner and, after the summer 
riots of 1835, the reinstatement of the liberal laws enacted by the Courts of 
Cadiz and those of the constitutional regime (1820-23) were to offer even 
greater possibilities.
11  
Thus, the legal framework defined by the Liberal State allowed for 
a process of privatising common property that would spread in line with 
local resolve. The only peculiarity, in the case of Navarra, was the ample 
power that the Law of 16 August 1841 bestowed on the provincial council 
                                                 
10 In December 1818, Fernando VII legalised the sales of 1808-14. Four months previously, 
the Cortes of Navarra had implemented the same for Navarra. Fontana & Garrabou, Guerra 
y hacienda, pp.131-149.   10
(Diputación) both in respect of this and other matters. The elite of the region 
was thus given ample independence in respect of government actions
12. 
From the consolidation of the liberal regime to the enactment of the Madoz 
Law almost 20,000 hectares were disposed of, providing the municipal 
treasuries with somewhat more than 4.6 million reales, with a modest 
increase in bidding.  
 
Table 1: Balance of the sale of municipal property in Navarra before the 
Madoz Law was applied 
   Estates  Size Size Valuation  Sale  price  Price  (rvn/ha)  ∆ 
Period no.  ha.    % rvn.  (10
3) rvn.  (10
3) Val.  Sale  % 
1808-20  4,261  18,122 23.0  10,351   10,956   571  605  5.8 
1826-33 197 3,598  4.6  620   884   172 246 42.5 
1834-40 891 25,031  31.8  5,236    3,669    209 147 -29.9 
1841-46  1275  16,240  20.6  4,019   4,303   248  265  7.1 
1847-54 762 2,887  3.7  311   334   108 116 7.2 
1855-60 850 12,808  16.3  3,215    4,487    251 350 39.6 
Total    8,236  78,686 100  23,753   24,634   302  313  3.7 
Val.= average price assessed in reales de vellón per hectare; Sale= average auction or sale price in 
reales de vellón per hectare. 
The figures for 1834-60 are the balance of sale and repurchase at each stage. 
In cases where there was no prior valuation, I have assigned the sale price as the valuation. 
Sources: De la Torre, Los campesinos, for the period 1808-20; AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various 
notary’s offices) for the remainder. 
 
The general disentailment of public property, decreed in May 1855, 
did not commence until some years later, pending political hard bargaining 
that delayed the approval of the regulations on the application of the law.  
But this did not  curtail the process that we have been observing. Moreover, 
the prospect of the State selling these properties, retaining 20 per cent of the 
                                                                                                                                               
11 A review of legislation in favour of the sale of commons in Nieto, Bienes comunales, 
pp.848-872. 
12 Law 16/8/1841 regulated the institutional acceptance of what up to this time had been the 
Kingdom of Navarra in the liberal nation State, safeguarding some jurisdictions on fiscal 
and municipal matters at the same time it alleviated the depleted regional funds and 
provided guarantees to those with public debt in Navarra. This marks the beginning of what 
is known as the autonomous regime or régimen foral.    11
auction price and submitting the remaining 80 per cent to the town councils 
as public debt, encouraged many villages to get there first so that the full 
amount of the sales could be kept and cash payment guaranteed. 
Furthermore, in so doing they had firm support from the provincial council,  
resentful of the loss of authority that the Madoz Law entailed. It was in this 
manner  that more than ten thousand hectares were disposed of in the five 
years during which the application of the Law of 1 May 1855 was 
suspended.  Coinciding with a generally expanding economy on this 
occasion the auctions allowed the councils to conduct sales under better 
conditions and with better results, as shown by the increase of almost 40% 
in auction prices over and above the assessed values.
13 
The disposal procedures used by the councils throughout this 
period throw more light on the conditions in which the process developed. 
Table 3 distinguishes four kinds: sale by public auction with expert 
assessment and prior advertising, which can be considered the legal and 
most popular procedure; sale by private tender without auction but with 
prior objective assessment; private sale without auction or advertising and 
often in the absence of a prior assessment; and legal appropriation for non-
payment of debts. The prevalence of this latter method during the absolutist 
decade reflects the categorical breakdown of local treasuries and the 
                                                 
13 Law 1/5/1855 was suspended on 14/10/1856 and was not reinstated until 2/10/1858. 
Eight months later (24/5/1859), after arduous negotiations between the provincial council 
and the Exchequer, it was declared applicable in Navarra, with the exception that 20% of 
the amount retained by the State would remain there for the villages. It was not until 
6/6/1861 that its enforcement was ordered in the province. (Iriarte Goñi, Bienes comunales 
p.170-176). Gómez Urdáñez, ‘Doctrinas y realidades’, has examined the political debates 
that prepared this intervention from 1835 onwards.   12
impossibility of alleviating this situation within a general context of 
deflation. Private deals made between corporations and capitalists were 
frequent throughout this period, but during the exceptional climate of the 
civil war it reached considerable proportions. Acts like these, which we 
should describe at the very least as irregular, were justified by the pressing 
cash flow problems experienced in the councils and were agreed on   
previous offers from wealthy buyers, who were often of the same kin or had 
other affinities with mayors or councillors.  Of less importance were the 
sales by private tender and without auction that were carried out with prior 
assessment of the land.  Generally speaking these were collective sales of 
land already ploughed or designated for ploughing that benefited the people 
in the villages.  They were conducted, thus, on the basis of a  broad 
consensus between the actions of the council and the wishes of local 
residents, and they tended to reinforce rather than weaken community 
bonds.  These methods were not mutually exclusive, whereby in the same 
locality public auctions with sales to the highest bidder coincided with 
closed and assessed price sales.
  
 
Table 2: Navarra, 1826-60. Conveyance procedures for rural properties sold 
by the municipalities. Data in thousands of rvn. 
   Public  auction  Assessed  Sale  Dealings  Embargo  Total 
Periods rvn %  rvn %  rvn %  rvn %  rvn % 
1826-33 1769  20.0 4.6  0.5  98.0 11.1 604.7  68.4 884.2  100 
1834-40  3,048.8  74.5  6.2 0.2 704.1  17.2  100.0  2.4 4,094.1  100 
1841-46  5,188.3  87.0  71.5  1.2 228.6  3.8 143.9  2.4 5,964.9  100 
1847-54 2,437.6  88.4 13.2 0.5  153.7  5.6  0  0  2,758.6  100 
1855-59  4,381.1  90.4  76.5  1.6 258.9  5.3 131.0  2.7 4,847.5  100 
Total  15,232.8  82.1  171.9  0.9 1,443.2  7.8 979.5  5.3 18,549.3  100 
There is no record for the sales to the value of  721.732 rvn. 
Sources: AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various notary’s offices) 
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Another aspect that allows us to provide a better outline of the 
process is the methods used for payment of the properties. It can be 
confirmed that payment in hard cash, that is, direct injection of cash flow 
into the municipal coffers, was more of an exception than a rule. Between 
1826 and 1860 less than two-fifths of the sale value of properties was paid 
by this method. The three remaining fifths were settled by means of 
submission of municipal debt papers and receipts for supplies to troops, of 
loans against local funds or, to a lesser extent, by means of payments in kind 
and deferred payments.  During the civil war, payment in kind - both 
immediate and payment by instalments - had certain relevance. However, 
the majority of payments were made by submitting supply receipts or loans, 
either from the buyer himself or acquired from other neighbours and often at 
a rate much lower than nominal values. 
 
Table 3: Navarra, 1826-60.  Methods of payment for rural properties sold by 
the municipalities. Data in percentages. 
Periods  A B C D E F G H Total 
1826-33  10.79  0 0 0 79.98  0 0 9.23  100 
1834-40  28.69  1.46 5.08 1.32 35.40  3.37 3.50 21.19  100 
1841-46  37.32 1.20  0  0  28.96 8.29  16.21 8.01  100 
1847-54  50.19  18.30  0  0.06 2.02 0.18 23.32  5.94 100 
1855-60  49.85 2.94  0  0  17.05 0  19.50 10.65 100 
Total  39.34  4.20 1.12 0.30 25.70  3.44 14.55  11.36  100 
A= immediate payment in cash; B= cash payment in deferred instalments; C= immediate payment 
in kind; D = deferred payment in kind; E= payment by means of submission of supply receipts or 
debt recognised by the council directly with the buyer; F= payment by means of submission of 
supply receipts or credits acquired by the buyer from third parties; G= encargamiento or express 
substitution on the part of the buyer of one or various mortgage debts on the municipality; H= No 
method of payment recorded.  
Sources: AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various notary’s offices) 
 
During the post war period the same trend continued, with the town 
councils transferring more third party debts to buyers who accepted 
encargamiento or formal substitution in the mortgage which until that time 
had been levied on corporations. At times, the councils even agreed to   14
partially finance the buyers, agreeing to cash payments – rarely in kind – in 
one or various instalments during the months or years following the signing 
of the deeds. This phenomenon became quite prevalent in the years prior to 
the enactment of the Madoz Law, representing up to 18 per cent of the sale 
value of properties. It is thus fitting to ask, whether the financial 
predicaments of the municipalities were perhaps more an alibi than an 
imperative in the development of a strategy of privatising common property 
on the part of the local and provincial elite. In this and subsequent stages, 
the municipal treasuries obtained high levels of direct cash flow, but this did 
not exceed half the value of the properties sold. Basically, the local 
treasuries could cope with their financial needs by selling patrimony that 
tended to replace old debts and transfer mortgage charges rather than 
guarantee liquidity; in short, more to reduce liabilities than to increase 
liquidity. 
 
Table 4: Navarra, 1834-60. Balance of the sale of large pasturelands 
(corralizas) in carta de gracia (sale with repurchase option).   
   Carta de gracia Sales      Repurchases carried out  
   No.  ha.  rvn  (10
3) *  No.  ha.  rvn  (10
3) ** 
1834-40  144  30,375  2,988.3    91.8  35  8,926 426.4   22.1 
1841-46  83 14,320  2,712.1    47.6  71 15,001  1,666.8    40.3 
1847-54  19  4,737 696.6   27.6  72  14,367  2,370.9    54.8 
1855-60  10  2,780 467.6   13.9  12  1,314 380.6   43.1 
Total  256 52,211  6,864.6    46.3  190 39,607  4,844.7    46.0 
*.- percentage represented by carta de gracia sales over the total sale of corralizas (calculated on 
auction prices) 
**.- proportion of the amount of repurchases that had been paid in cash and in hard currency (%). 
Sources: AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various notary’s offices) 
 
The slide from a process of unleashed sales for financial motives 
towards another, inspired more by sociological or doctrinal motives, can 
also be perceived in the sales methods used throughout the period.  Sales of 
a definitive nature were the exception during the civil war, with an   15
abundance of orders for properties, seasonal cessations and what were 
known as venta en carta de gracia (sale with repurchase option). In the 
early forties definitive sales were used for half of all operations and ended 
up being the absolutely predominant method used during the fifties. The 
advance of sales in perpetuity only confirms the change that was taking 
place in the expectations and criteria of those involved. 
From a financial point of view the process had an added 
characteristic, which in principle was rather unfavourable for the local 
coffers. Just under half of the sales (particularly of the large pasturelands 
known as corralizas) were made using the contractual method of venta en 
carta de gracia. This meant that the buyer granted the seller the option of 
recovering the property by returning the capital paid within a stipulated 
period of time. In exchange, the seller accepted a reduction in the initial 
auction starting price, which the law limited to one third of the assessed 
value. The sale thus operated as a credit instrument and, under this criterion, 
was amply used by villages during the dramatic situation of the civil war. In 
turn, some buyers showed greater interest in generating a large amount of 
liquid capital than in accumulating real estate. 
It was not rare for the same property to be sold and recovered 
several times by a council. On these occasions, the buyer/lender tended to 
conduct a lucrative business: the property was paid, to a large extent, with 
devalued municipal debt papers, the capital could then be recuperated in a 
few years, but in immediate cash and for the full registered value.   
Moreover, if it were a rich landowner to whom the contributions would go if 
the council decided to reorganise its accounts fiscally, the operation could   16
not have been more  lucrative.  From the point of view of the municipality, 
the sale served to alleviate the liabilities of local treasuries at a more or less 
critical time, at the cost of high value patrimonial assets, which in a more 
favourable climate could have been recovered through disposal of liquid 
assets. 
It is true that a substantial portion, roughly one forth, of these 
repurchase option sales were carried out due to the incapacity or 
unwillingness of the councils to raise the necessary capital to recover the 
property. And of the repurchases carried out during this period, one part 
served to proceed immediately to the sale of the property in perpetuity.
14 An 
accurate assessment of the process we are analysing should take into 
consideration these chains of sales and repurchases that exaggerate the 
amount of surface areas sold and capital mobilised. The figures reflect this 
synthetically, allowing a distinction to be made between the sales climate – 
an uninterrupted process with some acceleration already commented on – 
and those that during the early forties and mid fifties, for different reasons, 
allowed certain recuperations. 
15 
 
                                                 
14 It was thus that 34 corralizas occupying 11,188 hectares were sold once again, the 
majority before 1846. The councils only managed to recover 156 estates covering 28,419 
hectares. All in all, the councils were able to recover around half of the large estates sold 
with the option to repurchase. 
15 The repurchases of the early forties are in keeping with a context of local financial 
rationalisation after the war and the rectification of sales made without the due formalities 
or in flagrant illegality. During the fifties, they have more to do with the tensions that had 
arisen, in a growing economy, between agricultural uses and livestock use of space. In any 
case, it is important to point out that not only were pasture or cultivation rights sold; also 
included were houses, inns, farmyards, plots of land, saltmines, olive-oil mills, and flour 
mills.   17
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Sources: AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various notary’s offices) 
 
 
The description of the process for selling municipal property 
carried out up to here has allowed some of its most significant details to be 
taken into account, but many questions are still left unanswered. Why, 
despite the costs involved in the operation, did some municipalities strive to 
recover property sold? Or, on the contrary, if they had done bad business 
selling by means of carta de gracia, why did other municipalities not try to 
resolve this fact? Why was a great quantity of sales made in some areas, 
while in other villages that were weighed down by debts hardly anything 
was sold? The answer to these questions refers to the transformations,   18
tensions and resistance experienced in local communities during this period, 





In common with other regions of inland Spain, the geographical 
area of Navarra most affected by the process we are studying, the southern 
half, has a habitat with medium sized villages (an average of 1,636 
inhabitants in 1860). The social makeup of these villas was often complex. 
The plebeian sectors were made up of salaried workers (jornaleros) and 
farmers (labradores) with owned or leased land, together with some centres 
of craftspeople and shopkeepers.  The privilegiados included a small group 
of ancestral lineage supported by the institution of the mayorazgo (entailed 
estate with rigid order of hereditary succession); a larger group of people 
known as nobles  or hidalgos when it came to exempting themselves from 
paying certain taxes or to access public posts; and a large number of 
ecclesiastical institutions that offered places for the disinherited sons  of 
these families. Apart from these collectives, some individuals were worthy 
of note for their wealth (traders, manufacturers) or their merit (lawyers, 
doctors, and civil servants). This diverse complexity did not inhibit strong 
community cohesion (yet far from being egalitarian) supported by ample 
collective resources and manifesting itself in elaborate political and 
institutional forms.   19
The process of institutional change, which commenced in 1808, 
had an effect on this social structure. Not everyone participated equally in 
the opportunity offered by the crisis of the Ancien Régime. If we go on the 
amounts paid by the different social sectors in the south of Navarra, the 
main protagonists of the purchases were those that sources label as 
“hacendados”, thus defined for their precondition as proprietors, which 
made them worthy of the distinction of the title don that preceded their 
names.  The majority of them were nobles, the lesser were titleholders of 
some  mayorazgo, but in general they were far removed from the feudal 
lords and the high aristocracy residing in Court.  
 
Table 5: Navarra, 1826-60. Classification of the buyers of municipal property 
according to social categories. 
    Buyers   Estates  Surface  (ha.)   Sale  price 
Category    no. %  no. arable  pasture    rvn  (10
3) % 
Clergy   6  0.4  27  53  3,712   797.35   4.3 
Aristocracy   4  0.3  6  56  245   369.95   2.0 
Landowners    203 15.2  747 560 50,059    8,317.12    45.4 
Traders   22  1.6  103  322  16,412   4,367.70   23.8 
Livestock  breeders  64 4.8  130  85 17,672    2,445.98    13.3 
Peasants    1,025 76.6  3,574 2,026 2,175   1,404.05    7.7 
Civil  servants  9  0.7  20 11 1,635    327.53    1.8 
Associations   5  0.4  14  0  2,798   307.61   1.7 
Total    1,338 100  4,620 3,113 94,707    18,337.30  100 
Note: The figures corresponding to pastureland (corralizas) should be taken with care, as the balance 
of sales and repurchases has not been calculated. Thus, in some cases we will come across double or 
triple entries. For the analysis being carried out here this fact does not pose a problem. 
Sources: AGN/P (deeds pertaining to various notary offices) 
 
Following them, the business classes – traders, bankers, 
manufacturers – showed notable activity, making up almost one-fourth of 
the total value.  Large cattle farmers also participated to a large extent. 
Some of them were highlanders that raised sheep, moving from the 
Pyrenean pastures in the summer to the meadows of the Ebro in winter. 
Others were cattle farmers from the plains with sheep breeding ranches   20
some of whom – since the end of the 18
th Century – had also gone into the 
business of breeding fighting bulls. For both groups, the bidding  for the 
pastures became a defence against the offensive plough, efficiently 
contained until that time by the institutional framework of absolutism but 
from 1808 became overwhelming.  The pastures were also useful in the face 
of growing competition for grass among the various alternatives offered by 
livestock companies and in the face of the boom in bull ranches and horse 
breeding for farm work and riding.
16 
The three groups mentioned acquired the bulk of the pastures sold 
(89%), although this probably did not imply substantial changes in the 
social use of such land as previously it was also the great private cattle 
ranchers who monopolised the land.  The participation of the peasantry as 
purchaser of assets acquired greater significance in the case of cultivated 
fields, representing two thirds of the surface disposed of.   It involved lands 
previously occupied by the persons concerned or their ancestors and suertes 
(pieces of land) distributed or auctioned amongst the local people. However, 
although they represented the majority (76%) of the buyers, if we bear in 
mind the population volume of the zone studied (24,251 families in 1852), it 
is difficult to say it was a good opportunity for the farm workers. A smaller 
role was played by the privilegiados (clergy and aristocracy), the civil 
                                                 
16 The early forties, during which numerous corralizas were sold, coincided with a good 
climate for bull breeding. Where during 1826-30 each 4 to 5 year old bull had been sold for 
1,052 rvn on average, in 1841-45 the rate had gone up to 2,306 rvn; meanwhile, the price of 
wheat had only risen by 21.4% and table wine had dropped by 3.8%. It is during these years 
that bullfighting became the main recreation industry in mainland Spain, pervading popular 
culture (Shubert, Death and money). Prices are calculated based on Pérez de Laborda, 
Historia, p.28-138, and Lana, El sector agrario, p.211-212.    21
servants (notary publics, teachers, and State employees) and some 
proprietors’ associations. 
From the outset, a process such as that described, increasing the 
patrimony of the best situated segments of the rural population in detriment 
to the rural masses, stripped of their customary rights to common resources, 
must have subjected the communities to unprecedented tensions. If former 
equilibriums were devastated by the succession of wars, changes in the 
political system, more pronounced social differences, and the loss of 
collective rights to resources, what was the extent of this upheaval in the 
traditional balance?  Assuming the extent was considerable, how could a 
minimally stable social order be re-established?
17 
Part of the answer is to be found in the changes brought about by 
the liberal revolution in political organisation at a local level. The old 
mechanisms that guaranteed the exercise of seigneurial powers, the 
hereditary possession of public charges, and status representation in local 
entities were definitively abolished between 1810 and 1840 by municipal 
and seigniorial laws. In their place, a uniform system of electoral 
representation, based on a restricted electoral register, was established to 
create local councils. The new structure of political power inspired (and in 
part also corresponded to) the fusion of the local elite, regardless of origin 
or measure, into one sole class of proprietors (hacendados).  It was on these 
rural notables that the responsibility  fell for taking decisions on matters that 
                                                 
17 Nor should we fall into an idealisation of communal goods as a safe haven for the poor 
farmer. Shaw-Taylor, ‘Parliamentary Enclosure’, warned of this recently in contrast to the 
interpretation by Neeson, Commoners. For a wider perspective see, Moor, Shaw-Taylor & 
Warde, The management, and in the case of Spain Iriarte, ‘Common Lands’.   22
affected the local funds or municipal patrimony.  Thus, the capacity to 
resolve the crisis of local treasuries by disposing of assets, in detriment to 
alternatives such as direct taxation, resided in the rural bourgeoisie.   
However, the political and social control of this new class was not 
absolute, nor could it be exercised without a minimum of community 
sanctioning. An abrupt and complete disintegration of traditional criteria for 
access to resources, for the benefit of a small number of the newly 
privileged, ran the risk of destroying any remains of a sense of identity and 
collective recognition making the most elemental social cohesion 
unfeasible. This is not to say that social conflict was absent during this 
period, or that the repressive efforts of the authorities were not serious. On 
the contrary, tensions between different groups  in the rural world in relation 
to access to and use of resources marked the limits of what could be 
achieved with regard to redefining property rights. These limits were not 
necessarily uniform, given the different configuration of the social classes 
and correlations of strength at a local level in each context.
18 
It is only thus that we can understand the unusual and complex 
nature of the property rights that came into being during this period. The 
complete conveyance of absolute rights to a property was more the 
exception than the rule. When cultivated land was divided among the 
peasants or auctioned, the councils often reserved the right to use the 
pastures once the crops had been harvested. Or vice versa, when they sold 
the rights of use to grass in well-demarcated and fenced in pastureland 
                                                 
18 Izquierdo, El rostro de la comunidad, deals with collective order using community 
recognition mechanisms. In ‘Los campesinos navarros’, Gastón verifies the intensity of the 
social struggles between 1840 and 1868.   23
(corraliza), they subjected them to various conditions which, to varying 
degrees, limited the potentials of the new owners to the benefit of 
communities or individuals. Thus,  the new owners were often obliged to 
respect the rights acquired by those who had ploughed or planted vine 
within the perimeters of the estate. At other times wool, grass, rushes, 
manure, stone, lime, gypsum or hunting were reserved in favour of the 
residents for their own consumption.  The right of way or public access to 
water sources was often established for people and livestock. And there 
were often limitations that affected the pastures being sold: on occasion, the 
privatised right was subject to restrictions on the time during which the 
proprietor could use same, banning use in summer. Frequently, conditions 
were stipulated that allowed certain livestock use for the neighbours, either 
for collective use by community herds, or individual use for the horses of 
those that worked inside or outside the perimeter of the estate. Thus, the 
conditions under which common property was sold did not prove very 
detrimental to the traditional practices that were characteristic of the open-
field system. This was despite the fact that in the decree of 8/6/1813, the 
Courts of Cadiz had already established the freedom of landowners to fence 
off and close their estates and grasslands keeping their livestock separate. 
Did this slow down the dynamic of agricultural growth? It is 
difficult to offer an answer. To a certain degree, the sale of corralizas did 
slow down the ploughing process that had been unleashed at the end of the 
18
th Century.  In the majority of cases, whilst appropriation of common land 
by ploughers was being consolidated –(and indirectly legalised), obliging 
grass buyers to respect these possessions, new ploughing was prohibited. In   24
certain cases, the buyer managed to arrange evacuation of the occupied land, 
but at times the buyers also had to yield the right to plough or plant vines to 
neighbours, or they were expressly prohibited from ploughing the land 
themselves. Thus, although some land was sold for cultivation by the 
buyers, the process of disposal could substantially limit the growth in the 
supply of agricultural land that had been possible during the first thirty years 
of the 19
th century.  This had come about as a result of the downfall of what 
Llopis called the “anti-ploughing front”, a group of social sectors dominant 
under the belated feudalism (aristocracy, clergy, large cattle farmers, 
property rentiers that had obstructed the increase in the amount of land 
being cultivated during the 18
th century. The pressure of the plough did not 
disappear as a result,  but from then on, agricultural growth would depend 
perhaps more on specialisation and investment than on the mere addition of 
productive factors.
19 
The approximate appraisal that we can carry out in relation to 
agricultural production development during the nineteenth century would 
support this statement. Taking as reference official statistics of different 
origins at the beginning and end of the century
20, the balance differs 
partially if we take the whole province or only its southern district, where 
                                                 
19 Llopis, ‘Expansión, reformismo’, p. 129. The area worked in Navarra rose at an annual 
rate of 0.61% between 1818 and 1857, decreasing to 0.40% between this latter date and 
1900 (Lana, El sector agrario, p.91-103). Iriarte Goñi, Bienes comunales, p.308-351, has 
documented the ploughing and distribution of 54,325 hectares in common lands between 
1866 and 1935, most of which took place after 1906. 
20 Physical production figures are calculated on the basis of Lana, El sector agrario, p. 137-
146, and Gallego Martínez, ‘La producción agraria’, p.1019-1024. The Gross Agricultural 
Product has been calculated using the prices from the year 1857, published in Sanz Baeza, 
Estadística, p. 98-101.   25
the sale of municipal assets was more intense.  For the whole of Navarra, 
gross agricultural product grew by almost 60 per cent, supported by 
viniculture specialisation, the development of leguminous plants, linked to 
the substitution of the fallow field by the sown field, and the production of 
oil. In the southern sector, growth in production was far superior with a 
more intense improvement in the production of wine and oil and a 
significant diffusion of maize in irrigated fields. Part of this agricultural 
growth was absorbed by the demographic growth, but even so, gross 
agricultural product per person grew by 20 per cent for the whole province 
and by more than 40 per cent for the district of Tudela.  A definitive growth 
in agricultural production was seen, following partly the old view of adding 
more land and more labour to the production process, but also thanks to the 
increased specialisation and investment in ligneous plantations intended for 
the market.  Hence, there was also an increase in productivity, despite the 
fact that agriculture at the turn of the century sustained an overwhelming 
portion of the active population.  
 
Table 6. A balance of the gross agricultural product in Navarra and in the 
district of Tudela, 1799-1890. 
       N a v a r r a      T u d e l a   ( 2 2   v i l l a g e s )    
Product  Units    1799-1807  1886-90 f.  1800-06   1882-90 f. 
Wheat hl  (10
3)   693.6   848.8  1.22  81.0   115.2  1.42 
Rye hl  (10
3)    18.3   11.4 0.62 3.2    1.4  0.44 
Maize hl  (10
3)   115.3   134.3  1.16  1.2   15.4  12.83 
Barley hl  (10
3)   200.8   203.4  1.01  37.4   40.1  1.07 
Oats hl  (10
3)   109.5   142.7  1.30  4.4   5.5  1.25 
Cereals hl  (10
3)   1,143.0   1,340.6  1.17  127.2   177.6  1.40 
Pulses hl  (10
3)   67.7   112.7  1.66  4.8   5.7  1.19 
Wine hl  (10
3)   380.8   1,060.6  2.78  39.2   207.5  5.29 
Oil hl  (10
3)   9.4   15.2  1.62  4.2   12.9  3.07 
GAP rvn  (10
6)  146.54    233.58  1.59 17.3   40.9 2.36 
Population (10
3)   226.47   304.12  1.34  28.49   47.13  1.65 
GAP/Pop.  rvn   647   768 1.19  605   868 1.43 
f.: multiplication factor 
Production data in thousands of hectolitres and of population in thousands of inhabitants. Gross 
Agricultural Product (GAP) valued at 1857 prices and expressed in millions of reales vellón.   26
Sources: For population figures, García-Zúñiga, Hacienda, pp.162-177, Mikelarena, Demografía, 
p.88. For agricultural product Lana (1999), Gallego (1985), and J.C.A., Avance, p. 489-491. 
 
The institutional change that preceded the Madoz Law was, without 
doubt, more transitional than radical.  The use of the figure of venta en carta 
de gracia made it possible to regulate the privatisation process, maintaining 
an illusion of reversibility. Moreover, the definition of property rights 
assumed the concurrence of different usage rights on the same space and 
ended up being given a hierarchical structure with a law that was 
predominantly in favour of landowners, and rights being reduced to 
servidumbres (subaltern rights) for the neighbours. But this would be a task 
for successive generations who, particularly between 1880 and 1936, were 
immersed in a fierce struggle of a structural nature as to the exclusive 
definition of these property rights.  
For the moment, the process evolving between 1808 and 1860 
favoured the emerging classes in rural areas without completely shattering, 
in the short term, the community equilibrium on access to resources and 




The preceding paragraphs have allowed us to examine a somewhat 
unknown aspect of the institutional change that took place in 19
th century 
Spain during the liberal revolution. Underlining the spontaneous nature of 
the process and its upward trend, we can gain a better understanding of the 
political decisions that led to nationalisation and the auction of village 
properties from 1855. Progressive legislators, brought to power by the   27
revolution of 1854, did not bring about the commencement of a new 
process; they merely ordered and regulated it with the aim of controlling its 
processes and results. In this manner, they probably hoped to achieve a 
more in-depth liberalisation of property, participation of the Exchequer in 
the profits, and greater access to the land for social sectors of mid to lower 
extraction.
21  
But mobilisation of the land market did not have to wait for the 
application of the Madoz Law. Against the backdrop of war and the 
bankruptcy of municipal treasuries, that tended to split the rural 
communities, the gradual enlargement of markets for agricultural products 
and the permeation into society of a utilitarian individualism, systematised 
by the Enlightenment, were the driving forces behind the transformation of 
land into a commodity. 
However, what place did the process being analysed occupy in the 
cluster of transformations backed by the liberal revolution?  Even though it 
is of a provisional nature and limited to only one region, we can try to 
evaluate the direct impact of these events on rural land ownership. Taking 
into consideration ecclesiastic property alone and that of public entities, the 
amount of land mobilised in the process under study is of considerable 
proportion. In Navarra, at least, it represented two-thirds of the land 
                                                 
21 It is significant that the changes introduced by the Progressives of 1855 in respect of the 
ephemeral law of 25/9/1847 promoted by the Moderates to privatise the municipal property 
included: the division of estates into plots (wherever this did not imply a loss in value); 
payment conditions that were more favourable (from 4 instalments in 3 years to 15 
instalments in 14 years, with the first instalment being reduced from 50% to 10%); and 
payment in cash in place of deed titles. In theory, this should have allowed greater access to 
small fortunes in the auctions, but it would not ensure that they would be sold off cheaply.   28
auctioned by the State and the councils between 1806 and 1923.  Worth 
particular note is the fact that the application of the Madoz Law accounts for 
only one-fourth of the original common land that was disposed of during the 
nineteenth century.  In relation to the territory, the proportions are equally 
outstanding: commons disposed of between 1825 and 1860 represented 
5.7% of the 10,425 km
2 that the province occupies, reaching up to 16.3% if 
we restrict ourselves to the plains of the Ebro, where the process studied had 
greater impact.   
 
Table 7. A balance of the disentailment in Navarra. Surface area in hectares 
and valuation and auction in constant pesetas of 1913. 
 
     Estates  Surface   Valuation  Sale  price  ∆ Auction 
     No.  Ha.   Ptas   Ptas.   %  % 
Ecclesiastical disentailment   
1806-1808  3,708  871 0.7  n.d.   n.d.   -  - 
1820-1823  555 801 0.7  n.d.   n.d.   -  - 
1838-1854  5,590 5,760 4.9  10,556,159  18,318,692  +73.5 58.2 
1855-1893  6,398 2,374 2.0  2,088,865  4,043,868  +93.6 12.8 
Total 16,251  9,806  8.4  12,645,024  22,362,560  +76.8  71.0 
Sale of common property and civil disentailment 
1808-1820  4,261  18,122  15.6  n.d.   n.d.   -  - 
1826-1833  197  3,598  3.1  167,639   237,725   +41.8  0.7 
1834-1840 891  25,031  21.5  1,419,008  990,540    -30.2  3.1 
1841-1846  1,275  16,240  14.0  1,304,467 1,393,407 +6.8  4.4 
1847-1854  762  2,887  2.5  52,376   73,616   +40.6  0.2 
1855-1860 850  12,808  11.0  865,449    1,212,379  +40.1 3.9 
1862-1923  1,997  27,736  23.7  2,782,590 5,175,615 +86  16.4 
Sum    10,253  106,422  91.6  6,591,529 9,083,282 +37.8  28.9 
Total 26,504  116,228  100  19,236,553  31,445,842  +63.5  100 
*.- The data referring to municipal assets refers only to rural properties, the figures corresponding to 
disentailment of clergy property also includes urban estates. 
n.d.: no data available  
Sources: See note xxii. 
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In contrast, the proportion was much smaller in terms of mobilised 
capital, although we lack information to tally the balance
22. If the municipal 
assets sold between 1826 and 1860 represented 19.8 per cent of the assessed 
values, its participation in auctions was reduced by 12.3 per cent.  The 
reason is to be found in the fact that there were many cases of uncultivated 
land destined for forestry or pasture which was much less appreciated than 
cultivated land, that constituted ecclesiastic patrimony.  To this we must add 
the urgency with which many of these sales were verified and, in quite a few 
cases, the irregularities allowed by municipal authorities, at the end of the 
day responsible for the process and partly interested in the same.  It is still 
significant that it was in these sale processes controlled by the State and 
escaping the direct control of the local elite  that the highest average rise in 
bids was obtained.
23 
It is true that the type of rights transferred in these operations did 
not always guarantee a free and complete disposal of the privatised 
property.  Much of the property had ambiguous legal classifications due to 
the amplitude of rights reserved in favour of the councils or the 
communities of neighbours who interpreted it as a kind of shared property.  
In the short term this permitted intense privatisation of rights without 
forcing in excess the castigated equilibrium of the local society.  However, 
                                                 
22 I have converted the series offered by Mutiloa, Desamortización eclesiástica, p.263, 
331,696, and Donézar, Desamortización de Mendizábal, p.205-295, for ecclesiastical 
disentail together with my own figures in constant pesetas of 1913 using Sardá’s deflator, 
reproduced by Ojeda Eiseley, Índices de precios, p.66-67, which is also used by Iriarte 
Goñi, Bienes comunales, p.183-230. 
23 The possibility of paying the State for auctioned property with paper notes and over long 
periods of up to ten years oblige us to be careful when assessing the profits made by the 
sellers.   30
in the medium and long term, it was to become a source of tension as the 
interest in perfect dominion of the corraliceros (owners of the pastures) 
came face to face with the peasants’ awareness of dispossession, which fed 
the intense agrarian conflicts of the first forty years of the 20
th century.
24 
Likewise, the privatisation process being analysed did not 
guarantee the triumph of the ideal of property rights that liberalism 
advocated and that had been modelled by the Napoleonic Code Civil. In 
many cases the sales expressly perpetuated the customary practices of the 
open-field (stubble grazing, common pastureland, collective herds) which 
Spain’s liberal legislation itself had been trying to eradicate since 1813. This 
raises a two-part question with profound implications: did this signify a 
weakness in the process of institutional change?  And if this were so, did it 
have negative repercussions on the possibilities of economic growth? 
A positive response to the first question implies the assumption of 
some apriorities that are probably erroneous. In the first place, it supposes 
that the definition of property rights is a teleological process that leads to 
individualism and simplicity. On the contrary, we should not forget that 
multiplicity of rights to a property is not equivalent to the confusion of the 
same.  Tradition, institutionalised in the bylaws, and the conditioning of the 
sales deeds generally established sufficiently clearly the identity and 
obligations of different users, categorising them into different levels and 
identifying their limits with the aim of distinguishing their use and 
guaranteeing sustainability.  The second supposition is that a radical change 
in the definition of rights is better than a process of gradual change.  Against 
                                                 
24 See De la Torre & Lana, ‘El asalto’.   31
the clarity in the contrast of the former, the chiaroscuro of the latter perhaps 
allows a better modulation of changes in the specific conditions in which 
they develop. This does not mean ignoring the social costs involved in 
privatisation carried out on the margins of parliamentary decrees. 
25 
The “incomplete” transformation of the property system in the 
context of the liberal revolution is not, however, peculiar to Spain.  Even in 
France, cradle of the revolution and maximum exponent of the new concept 
of property, we come across the survival of communal assets.   Surviving 
the waves of partages  in 1769-81 and 1792-1804, the commons and 
community obligations persisted in extensive parts of the country, partly 
because of the interests of the rural notables.  This gave rise to some authors 
explaining the so-called relative historic “failure” of the French economy as 
opposed to the British on the basis of  the “archaism” of its rural structures.  
However, it has also been defended, from the long-term perspective, that we 
are facing different models of growth; which in short, rather than seek 
winners and losers we should seek the nuances which make the processes 
intelligible.
26 
This reflection leads us to the second question: what repercussions 
did the institutional change outlined have on the economic growth?  Any 
allegation is premature until we have more complete information at our 
                                                 
25 A testimony to this is the process experienced in many English villages before the 
parliamentary enclosures, with which the phenomenon that we have analysed has some 
affinity. See Neeson, Commoners, pp.81-109, Thirsk, Agricultural change, pp.54-109, 
Birtles, ‘Common land, poor relief’. 
26  The most complete study on communal goods in France, Vivier, Propriété collective. 
Concerning the relative success or failure of the English and French economies, see   
O’Brien & Keyder, ‘Les voies de passage’, and Moriceau, ‘Au rendez-vous de la révolution 
agricole’.   32
disposal.  After all, not even in the case of England is it clear what degree of 
participation the enclosures process had on the growth of agricultural 
produce and productivity.  What there does seem to be agreement on is that 
the agricultural structures of the open-field did not necessarily obstruct 
innovation. The question is rooted in the flexibility of the system to respond 
to the incentives offered by the market and in the mechanisms that 
determine the distribution of production amongst the different social 
persons.
 27 
With respect to the former, it would be inappropriate to draw 
conclusions, but it does not seem that regional agriculture was incapable of 
making good use of the opportunities offered by the market in the mid 
decades of the 19
th Century.  The growth of vineyards and olive groves and 
the increase (although ephemeral) in the breeding of sheep and fighting 
bulls are a good indication of this, although other routes or  tempos may 
have been possible. With regard to the distribution mechanisms for 
agricultural produce, there is no doubt that social inequalities were 
intensified to the benefit of a new class of large rural landowners and that 
many peasants were denied access to resources that were important for the 
survival of their families.  However, the disposal process did not completely 
expropriate the peasant classes nor did it deplete the reserves of common 
assets, which allowed a historical cycle of property distribution to emerge in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The accumulations thus 
became compatible with an incomplete process of proletarianization. 
                                                 
27 Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman,  Overton, Agricultural revolution. Turner, ‘Benefits 
but at cost’. In the case of France, Grantham, ‘The Persistence’, also affirms that the 
survival of the open-field was not an obstacle for technical change.    33
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